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It is the Chinese opinion that the Algerian problem can be solved only through military action -- in particular, by the bombing of Algerian towns by the FLN. The Chinese have planes and pilots ready to assist the rebels, and have made approaches to the FLN to Tunisia and Morocco seeking airstrips and bases, but were rejected. Certain other independent African states wanted to observe the effects of DeGaulle's new proposals to the rebels. No outside power would dare interfere if such stepped-up rebel action occurred, the Chinese believe, because of sympathy throughout the world for the Algerians. A French invasion of Tunisia or Morocco would arouse the entire Arab World -- including Egypt -- against France. If this occurred, a revolutionary situation might arise, or could possibly be created, in metropolitan France. This, the Chinese pointed out, is the kind of revolutionary potential on which international Communism should concentrate, rather than on peace movements and popular fronts.

Soviet Communist leaders, however, are firmly opposed to any military adventures, especially in Algeria, where such action would destroy Moscow's diplomatic plans in connection with DeGaulle.

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The impression [REDACTED]

25X1X6 [REDACTED] was that basic issues are left unresolved, and that compromises are sought on differences of opinion between Moscow and Peking. There will very likely be a period of limited compromise, in which Moscow occasionally yields to Peking's demand, but Moscow will remain adamant where it has vital political advantages at stake, as in Egypt.

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closely with moderate bourgeois circles, particularly with Western Socialist parties. This is also Khrushchev's opinion, but the Chinese Communists reject this strategy. Their view is that in a period of detente, for the very reason that there is no danger of all-out war, the Communist parties must be aggressive and hostile towards non-Communists, and stress anti-bourgeois and anti-Socialist propaganda. The Chinese put anti-colonialism first; this is played down by the Soviets because they consider it more important to reach political agreements with France and England. The Chinese want more effort to be put on Latin American Communist parties; the Soviets regard this area as of only secondary importance, and therefore are less inclined toward action there.v

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DIFFERENCES BETWEEN THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF THE
SOVIET UNION AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY OF CHINA ON
INTERNATIONAL COMMUNIST
STRATEGY

In July 1959 an international conference of Communist leaders was held, ~~probably~~ in Prague. In the discussion of some of the broad problems of international Communist strategy, strong differences of view between the Soviet and Chinese Communists became apparent.

Italian Communist representatives recommended the broadening of the World Peace Movement to include non-Communist elements. The Chinese Communists objected vigorously to this; they insisted that even sharper lines should be drawn between Communists and non-Communists. Any relaxation in Communist foreign policy, they said, should be accompanied by tighter controls within the Communist parties and within the ~~front~~ organizations. At first, the Soviets were inclined to support the Italian view, but there was no active debate, and the problem remained unresolved.

The Italians proposed that the Italian Communist Party develop more contacts with Vatican circles, and that proposals regarding Italian politics be made to them. The Chinese were adamant against this, and warned against relaxing opposition to bourgeois, religious, and even democratic leftist groups, because of the danger of revisionist softening similar to the experiences of 1956. The point was carried by the Chinese, and the proposal was dropped.

The Italians, who are ~~responsible for~~ ^{close to} the Egyptian Communist Party, claimed that it was a mistake to let down the Egyptian Party by accepting Nasr's persecution of it. They were supported

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
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~~The Chinese want to engage military forces in the Algerian revolt.~~

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